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Abstract—The authors have found a gap in studies regarding 
the relation between cohabitation and mixed electoral system in 
Lithuania and Palestine. Elgie & McMenamin (2011) has argued 
that cohabitation is less likely to occur when there are few or many 
parties in electoral system; against this statement, we argue that 
cohabitation is more likely to occur when electoral fractionalization 
is high. In the present study, by comparative method among three 
samples of mixed legislative elections, Lithuanian 1992, 
Lithuanian 1996 and Palestinian 2006, we find evidence about 
relation between electoral fractionalization and polarization toward 
big parties. That relation may explain the likelihood of 
cohabitations’ electoral conditions. 
Keywords—Sustained democracy, Cohabitation, Mixed 
electoral system, Duverger low, Palestinian and Lithuanian 
legislative elections 
I.  Introduction 
Cohabitation is a rare phenomenon occurs just in semi-
presidential system, when the executive authority is divided 
between the president and prime minister; both are from 
different parties. Under this situation, the deadlock threatens 
stability in the political system, because of competition and 
struggle between president and prime minister from opposite 
parties.(Shugart & Carey, 1992). For this perspective, Elgie  
and McMenamin (2011)  have found just 44 periods of 
cohabitation in 18 semi-presidential countries, from 1989 
until 2008. 
 
The previous researches discuss in more details, the 
institutional factors and political situation, and how they 
affect democracy consolidation in semi-Presidential system. 
Samuels and Shugart (2010) have found cohabitation is 
more likely to occur in the cases of Primer-Presidential 
system type.  
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Elgie & McMenamin (2011)has confirmed Shugart and 
Samuel’s (2010) study results. Elgie argues several times, 
Elgie (2007) finds that Primer–Presidential system is more 
dangerous on democracy sustainability than Presidential–
Parliamentary type of semi-presidential system. He also 
insures  that cohabitation is more likely to break down the 
nascent democracies than durability and settled 
democracies. Indeed, neither Shugart, nor Elgie, does not 
consider, in their research, the relationship between electoral 
system and cohabitation. As it is clear from Elgie & 
McMenamin (2011) study  that they have found a relation 
between party fragmentation and cohabitation possibilities. 
They confirmed thier hypothesis as cohabitation is less 
likely to occur when there are few numbers of parties or 
much number of parties, but that result is not clear enough to 
explain why and how come that will be done, is there any 
relation between both factors?, has this relation been 
affected by electoral system?. Our research tries to answer 
these questions, it focuses on the situation and condition of 
the effect of party fragmentation on occurring cohabitation 
status in mixed electoral system. 
II. Literature Review 
Scholars discuss many threats which can breakdown 
democracy, some of these threats and risks elements are 
economic growth as Lipset has argued (1959). Limongi and 
his colleagues (1996) confirm these pre-requisite social-
economic conditions of democracy consolidation. Enterline 
& Greig (2010) argue that ethnic divided society and 
development economic system affect foreign imposed 
democracy countries. Mathweson (2013) identify that 
foreign imposed democracy change can be succeed if 
occupier distribute economical values, and protect the target 
state from foreign threaten. Reynolds (1996) agreed with 
that. Linz (1990) finds that Presidential system is less likely 
to increase democracy level in countries. Lijphart (1999) in 
his study for 36 political system agrees with that; he argues 
that institutional factors play important rule in sustainable 
democracy, such as the nature of political system, and 
electoral system. He finds that Parliamentary system is more 
likely to achieve democracy sustainability. Limongi (1996) 
re-insures that finding, identify that the average age of semi-
presidential systems is less than the parliamentary systems. 
Shugrat &Carey (1992) explains that political system type is 
not enough to determine the likelihood of democracy 
consolidation; it needs to analyses the presidential 
institutional power, their study shows that the higher of 
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The perils of Semi-presidential 
System 
Sartori (1997) has identified criteria of semi-presidentialism 
as system has president, who is elected for a fixed term by 
popular, shares with a prime minister the executive power. 
The president is independent from parliament, but he needs 
to govern through his government (cabinet), and finally, 
prime minister and his cabinet need to get support from 
parliamentary majority in order to have confidence. 
 
Scholars emphasize that semi-presidential system has 
negative impacts on democracy sustainability. Linz (1990) 
has indicated that semi-presidential system will threat 
democracy, particularly, when the cohabitation is occurred. 
In this case, president will be more attentive to use un-
institutional tools to finish the deadlock in regime, like using 
his influence on military forces to threat the opposition, or to 
seize power illegally. Lijphart (1999) have considered semi-
presidential system as transition point from presidential 
system toward parliamentary; he deals with this system as 
party system fragmentation and indicates the un-stability of 
the nature of this system. Lijphart (1999) has argued that 
semi-presidential systems increase the possibilities of 
president’s highest power than pure semi-presidential 
system. On other hand, the perils of semi-presidential 
system will be considered, when it will produce divided 
minority government, as Skach  (2005 ). She defined this 
situation as the case where “neither the president nor the 
prime minister, nor any party or coalition, enjoys a 
substantive majority in the legislature” (Skach, 2005, p17). 
In contrast, Elgie (2007) has somewhat moderated his 
opinion between this theoretical puzzle, he indicates that, 
“The direct election of the president may encourage the 
personalization of the political process, and it may 
encourage the president to disregard the rule of law because 
s/he feels above the normal political process.”  Elgie (2007, 
p. 56). In his conclusion, Elgie (2007) has found that there 
are many perils of semi-presidential system, but he defines 
that the primer-presidential system should be adopted than 
presidential-parliamentary type in order to sustain 
democracy in semi-presidential democracies. 
  
Mixed electoral system  
Electoral system is divided into 3 main categories  (Blais & 
Massicotte, 1996) 
1- Plurality/Majority system. Plurality known as first-
past-the-post (FPTP) as in Britten parliamentary 
election, especially is preferred in single-member 
districts. In this system a candidate who gets more 
votes, simply he wins. Majority system puts more 
conditions in this rule, and it requires candidate 
gets more than 50% of the vote to win.  
2- Proportional System (PR). PR can be used only in 
multimember districts or national level; each party 
gets number of seats under accounts of its vote 
shares.   
3- Mixed electoral system, as Germany, Japan. 
Usually has two tiers; one of them is 
Majority/Plurality election, and the other is 
proportional system. 
 
In general perspective, until now there is no concrete theory 
for mixed electoral system; many scholars have different 
definitions of that type, as Blais & Massicotte (1996) have 
argued. For long time, scholars consider mixed electoral 
system as a minor system, which doesn’t help improvement 
of a concrete theory for that particular system (Strauch & 
Pogoreli, 2011). Lijphart  (1999) argues that proportional 
electoral system will increase democracy stability more than 
majority/plurality system. Rogowski (as cited in Boix,1999) 
argues that proportional system (PR) encourages democracy 
sustainability because PR system is more capable to face 
rent-seeking groups in state. Cheibub & Chernykh (2009) 
have identified that semi-presidential system has more 
tendency to use specific electoral system, which increases 
party fragmentation in Parliament more than majority 
electoral system, therefore, in these political systems, there 
is more tendency to form collation government than it has 
been occurred in majority electoral system. 
 
Duverger law 
The electoral system literature is based on three principals of 
Duverger conditions; PR systems tend to produce multi-
party systems; two-ballot majoritarian systems promote 
multiple parties aligned with two camps; and plurality 
systems promote bipartism (Duverger, 1984). Indeed, 
Duverger does not provide formal definitions of his famous 
mechanical and psychological factors (Duverger low), he 
considers them as the 'phenomena of polarization and under-
representation (Blais & Carty, 1991) 
 
Blais & Massicotte (1996) confirm Duverger low in their 
study. Cox (1997) criticizes Duverger law. He argues that 
this law has limited explanation of voter strategy voting. In 
district level, strategic voting requires certain and particular 
conditions regarding actors’ motivations and intensives, 
preferences, time horizons, and availability with clarity of 
accurate information. Plurality SMD elections may not work 
as Duverger law does. Voters may not to reduce their votes 
to small parties toward the biggest; in one of these cases has 
been occurred: voters who are not short-term instrumentally 
rational may have a lack of public information about voter 




In this article we use comparative method to compare 
between three cases of cohabitation occurred in mixed 
electoral system, two of them occurred in Lithuania, the 
third occurred in Palestine. The first Lithuania sample of 
cohabitation occurred in 1992, when President Vytautas 
Landsbergis formed LPS party. In this period there was a 
little period of cohabitation (less than 1 one month) in Jan 
1991 when prime-minister Albertas Simenas  formed LKDP 
party, and then when Mr. Brazauskas formed LDDP party, 
he was elected President of the Republic from 1992 until 
1998. The second cohabitation was in 1997 when Mr. 
Gediminas Vagnorius was appointed as a prime minister. 
("Lithuania Parliamentary elections "). In another part, 
Palestine is an occupied country. Since Oslo agreement 
 
48 
Proc. of the Third Intl. Conf. on Advances in Economics, Management and Social Study - EMS 2015 
Copyright © Institute of Research Engineers and Doctors, USA .All rights reserved. 
ISBN: 978-1-63248-058-3  doi: 10.15224/ 978-1-63248-058-3-92 
1993, Palestinian Authority (PNA) was established. In 2006, 
the second legislative election was held with most of the 
opposing parties’ participation. Hamas, the Islamic party 
won, and got 74 seats from 132 seats. This unexpected 
situation created cohabitation period from February 2006 
until mid of 2007. Within this period, conflict had increased 
between the president Abbas and Prime Minister Hania from 
Hamas movement. President eventually  resolved the 
government, that, led the country to civil war, finished in 
split between West Bank under Fatah ruling, and Gaza under 
Hamas ruling (Cavatorta & Elgie, 2009; Lopes, n.d) . 
 
Methodology 
We argue that cohabitation will be less likely when electoral 
fractionalization in legislative council increases; that is why, 
in this situation, it will be more difficult for any single party 
to get 50% of total seats in parliament or above. In another 
world, more parties in parliament reduce the likelihood of 
gaining much seats in parliament for each party. Electoral 
fractionalization is indicated as effective number of 
parties(Eff Nv) (Blais & Carty, 1991). We will use formula 
of effective number of parties (Eff Nv) as provides by 
Laakso and Taagepera (1979) Formula  which equals  
                                                                            (1) 
when Vi is the share of the vote  obtained by the ith party. 
We measure party system fractionalization by counting 
parties weighted by their national shares of votes or seats. 
We rely on study calculation of this figure as calculated in 
dataset of election indices (Gallagher, 2013). 
In order to capture all of indictors of electoral 
fractionalization, we will use another important independent 
variable. Number of political parties attend to compete in 
election in both tiers, SMD and PR. We suppose 
psychological effect also affects parties as Duverger law. 
The idea here is that the small parties will not spend more 
effort, money and time in competing in SMD, because they 
have small chances to win a seat within plurality electoral 
system. Therefore, they will concentrate in PR list, which 
gives them more chances to win a seat comparing with their 
votes. We calculate this variable as total number of political 
parties’ candidate in PR list minus total number of political 
parties’ candidate in SMD election; result of this simple 
formula must have high deviation between the both 
numbers.  If it is huge, that means there are fewer parties 
attend SMD than PR; which indicates that there will be more 
polarization toward the two big parties (low fractionalized). 
If result has small deviation, that means there, is less 
polarization toward both big parties (more fractionalized). 
To calculate these deviation we rely on the information 
listed 
in(http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/electi
on_types/parliamentary_elections.html, which provides very 
strong information about all of Europe election. We count 
all of parties that have any percentage of vote in list election, 
and then we have done the same thing in single election first 
round. By this way, we can know the exact number of 
parties participation in both tiers. In Palestine case, we count 
on Central election commission –Palestine, which provides 
information about each parties, https://www.elections.ps/  
By this view, our first hypothesis is: 
H1 – Electoral Fractionalization is less likely to increase in 
mixed electoral system, when the vote sharing for 
independents candidates is high. 
 
Shugart, M.F (1985) said that big party should take vote 
share in SMD more than in PR list because of Duverger law. 
Therefore, we will calculate the deviation between the both 
shares in two tiers in order to examine Duverger law. We 
use the deviation of share of the vote for the first party 
between the two tiers (D1), and the deviation of  share of the 
vote for the second party between the two tiers (D2),  
calculated as vote share for party in List tier minus vote 
share for this part in SMD tier. If this deviation is positive, 
that means there is less polarization (the votes more 
fractionalized), and if it is negative, that means there are 
more polarization (the votes less fractionalized). That is why 
more votes go to independent candidates. By this view, our 
sub-hypothesis are: 
H1-1- Polarization to big parties is less likely to increase in 
mixed electoral system, when the vote sharing for 
independents candidates is high 
H1-2- Effective number of electoral parties is less likely to 
increase in mixed electoral system, when the vote share for 
independents candidates is high. 
  We take the information of numbers and vote share of 
independent candidate in Lithuania elections from this 
website 
http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexElections.asp. 
In Palestine case, we use the election data published in 
Central election commission website 
https://www.elections.ps/ar/tabid/587/language/en-
US/Default.aspx  
Disproportionality of SMD tiers is the most important aspect 
of proportionality in mixed systems. That is why list tier 
(PR) has low level of disproportionality. When 
disproportionality increases, it means more wasting votes 
and more polarization toward big parties. Plurality electoral 
system makes more disproportionality than PR and majority 
system as Lijpahrt (1999), therefore, there are high effective 
number of parties in PR system than plurality system. We 
can measure disproportionality (Lsq) by distributions of 
votes / seats; this total is divided by 2; and then the square 
root of this value is taken. We also relay on study 
calculation of this figure as calculated in dataset of election 
indices (Gallagher, 2013). Finally, we will use the same 
figures of D1, D2 to determine polarization, therefore, our 
second hypotheses are: 
H2-Polarization to big parties is more likely to increase in 
mixed electoral system, when the disproportionality is high. 
H3-Effective number of electoral parties is less likely to 
increase in mixed electoral system, when the 
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III. Results 
The results indicate that there is less polarization towards 
both big parties, which means that the voters have attended 
to change their behavior of voting in SMD to other small 
parties, which happened in Lithuania legislative elections in 
1992 and 1996, or give their votes to independent 
candidates, like Palestinian case. It appears clearly that 
Duverger law cannot be implemented in our three samples 
with one exception the second big party in Lithuania 
election in 1996, LKDP, which gains 2.7 % plus vote in List 
election tier, but all of other cases indicate that the big 
parties have taken in List tier votes share more than in 
district level. 
 
In correlation regression, Model (1), we can see strong 
positive relation between DV2 and vote share, the strength 
of relation is about 85%, which means that by increasing 
vote sharing for independent candidates, the deviation 
between second partys’ vote-share  between two tier (DV2) 
will increase, that means, polarization to the second party 
will be reduced. In contrast to DV1, we can notice also in 
Model (1), that there is nearly medium negative relation 
between DV1 and vote sharing. The strength of relation is 
about -41% , which means that by increasing vote share for 
independent candidates, the deviation between first  party’s 
vote-share between two tier (DV1) will decrease, so 
polarization to the first party increases, but in few lower 
than reducing polarization to second party. The finding for 
both dependent variables is that, while vote share for 
independent candidates is increased, polarization to second 
party is reduced strongly, but polarization to the first big 
party goes positively. This finding prove our hypothesis H1-
1/H1-2, indicates that the party get more votes will get less 
punishment from independents voters than the parties get 
second or even third vote share. As we can notice this  result 
when we see the correlation between number of independent 
candidates competing, and DV2, which is strongly positive,  
77%, but opposite relation with DV1 is shown as -52%. 
 
In our three samples of election, the independent candidates 
and small parties compete strongly against the big parties in 
district level, that gives them more vote- share percentage 
from all of the votes in districts level, as for example, 4.3% 
in Lithuania election 1992, 3.4% in its legislative election in 
1996. The huge percentage of vote sharing for independent 
candidates was in Palestinian legislative election in 2006, 
20.4%, that is because there are more than 266 independent 
candidates; more than 130 of them are defectors from Fateh. 
This value explains why Hamas as opposite party beats 
Fateh easily; electoral split their tickets in districts level, and 
then of course, Fateh lose the game (see Model 1).  
 
 By regression in Model 1, we can prove our hypotheses H2 
clearly; there is strong negative relation between effective 
number of parliamentary parties and both of vote share of 
independent candidates, and their numbers. It means that 
when the independent’s vote share / numbers increases, the 
effective number will strongly be reduced, same as in our 
hypothesis. 
 
As the table 1. appears, disproportionality average in our 
three cases is 11.7, which reflects high disproportionality in 
district level more than list. Indeed if we compare this rate 
of disproportionality with the mean rate of 
disproportionality of number of mixed electoral system, 
which was calculated in Moser & Scheiner’s (2004) study, 
we find the means is 16.9, but our sample’s mean of 
disproportionality is 11.7. Our rate is lower than means 
disproportionality in another mixed electoral system, which 
proves our hypothesis.  
 
It’s obvious from Model (1) that there is strong negative 
relation between disproportionality (lsq) and both DV1,DV2  
-60%, -87% respectively, that means while Lsq increases, 
the deviation of  share of the vote for the both big parties 
into two tiers decreases, and that means more polarization 
for both parties because of high Lsq, the same as our 
hypothesis. Using correlation regression, Model (1), also, 
we can find that there is strong positive relation between 
disproportionality and effective number of parliamentary 
parties, and that means that when Lsq increases, the 
effective number of electoral parties, increases also. This 
result indeed, is in contrast with our hypothesis, as we notice 
from previous study, the relation must be negative; may be 
the reason for that, is because of small size of samples, or 
because of big number of small parties in district level in 
Lithuania  or big numbers of independent candidates in 
Palestine case.  
Conclusion 
This study investigates in mixed electoral system with 3 
samples, 2 in Lithuanian legislative election 1992, 1996, and 
the last is Palestinian election. We have found interesting 
result in this field. The main point in this research is 
explaining the strong relation between electoral 
fractionalization and cohabitation. By comparative method 
between three samples of legislative election in cohabitation 
periods, we have found there negative relation between 
polarization to big parties and likelihood of cohabitation. It 
is obvious that Duverger law is not working well in our 
three-mixed electoral system. The voters give less votes to 
big parties in district level. In addition, in contrast of 
Duverger law, the parties and independent candidate has 
much involvement in district level. We notice less 
disproportionality in our three samples comparing with other 
mixed elections in previous studies. However, we have not 
found much support about our hypothesis that relation 
between effective and disproportionality; we think that 
hypothesis needs more investigation.  
 
The main recommendation for this study is to fill the gap by 
researches about the relation between electoral system and 
cohabitation. We think this study is one-step in this field, but 
there must be many researches in order to know and 
examine all of electoral characters, which influence to occur 
cohabitation. We believe that cohabitation has many risks at 
new democracies; by this future research, they can 
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TABLE 1.  ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND  








Eff Nv : effective number of parties, Isq : Disproportionality .  Nc : Number 
of Independent candidates  
Dp : Number of parties in List tier (Npr)  minus Number of parties in 
district(Nd) 
Dv1 : deviation of  share of the vote for the first party between the two tiers 




MODEL 1. CORRELATION RELATIONS OF  
                  ELECTORAL FRACTIONALIZTION 
                  





Eff Nv 1 
     
Dv1 -0.16274 1 
    
Dv2 -0.99919 0.122808 1 
   
Isq 0.893008 -0.58937 -0.87413 1 
  





N c -0.83105 -0.41354 0.852806 
-
0.49182 0.991691 1 
 
Eff Nv : effective number of parties, Isq : Disproportionality .  Nc : Number 
of Independent candidates  
Dp : Number of parties in List tier (Npr)  minus Number of parties in 
district(Nd) 
Dv1 : deviation of  share of the vote for the first party between the two tiers 
Dv2: deviation of share of the vote for the second party between the two 
tiers 
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